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The article discusses ten versions of resi-
dual income known in the literature from 
the point of view of four criteria that are of 
special importance if the measure is to be 
the basis of managerial bonuses: goal-con-
gruity, controllability, understandability and 
practicability. There is – on average – a 
considerable trade-off between goal-con-
gruity and the three remaining criteria. 
However, there are residual income ver-
sions – like net economic income (NEI) and 
the variant of residual income that is based 
exclusively on unadjusted book values (RIBV) 
– which demonstrate outstandingly favora-
ble levels of goal-congruity, controllability, 
understandability and practicability. Al-
though NEI exhibits the highest level of goal-
congruity among the ten versions of resi-
dual income studied in the article and ac-
ceptable levels of three remaining features, 
it is deficient of intensive scientific examination which is necessary 
to make such a new tool the subject of justified recommendation. 
On the other hand, RIBV is the most controllable and seems to be 
the most understandable and the most practicable among the ten 
versions analyzed in the paper. However, its goal-congruity is 
relatively low. Yet, it can be improved without making the 
computational formula more complex simply by including some 
mechanisms making managers less myopic in bonus plan 
architecture. 
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1.  Introduction 
Residual income is a well-known, although not extensively
used in practice, measure of firm periodic performance. It
differs from standard accounting income in inclusion of
opportunity cost of capital in its calculation. The basic
premise of its utilization relates to the benefits the metric
can offer as the basis of managerial bonuses: the inclu-
sion of opportunity cost of capital should aim managerial
effort at firm value maximization and result in more goal-
congruent investment decisions made by the firm execu-
tives. However, to serve as an effective incentive com-
pensation tool, residual income has to satisfy some pre-
liminary conditions referring to its controllability, unders-
tandability and practicability, besides the aforementioned
goal-congruity. Residual income variants known from the
literature satisfy these conditions to different degrees.
There are residual income concepts exhibiting outstan-
dingly high goal-congruity, yet hardly utilizable in practice.
On the other hand, there are forms of the measure which
reveal lower goal-congruity but which are considerably
more understandable and practicable. Assuming that
there are trade-offs among the degrees to which the four
above mentioned criteria can be fulfilled by residual in-
come, it seems reasonable to choose the version of the
metric that is characterized by the best proportions in sa-
tisfying the conditions. There is no comprehensive com-
parative analysis of various residual income concepts in
these four dimensions in the existing literature. This paper
tries to fill the gap by evaluating ten variants of residual in-
come known in the literature from the points of view of
their goal-congruity, controllability, understandability and
practicability. The aim of the paper is to give some prelimi-
nary recommendations as to the way the potential users of
residual income should choose the form of the metric that
is the most adequate in light of the internal (i.e. motiva-
tional and compensational) premises of its utilization.Andrzej CWYNAR 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The 
first section discusses the essence, forms and premises 
of utilization of residual income. The second section looks 
at the fundamental criteria that should be used in eva-
luating different residual income concepts assuming that 
the metric is to be the basis of managerial bonuses (goal-
congruity, controllability, understandability and practica-
bility). Section three examines ten residual income va-
riants known from the literature by using a four-dimen-
sional matrix including the aforesaid criteria. Finally, the 
fourth section provides a conclusion. 
2. The Essence, Forms and Premises of Utilization 
of Residual Income 
Residual income is defined as income from capital in-
vested in a firm’s assets including opportunity cost of the 
capital. It is calculated as the monetary difference be-
tween return on capital and cost of the capital, the latter 
variable being the result of multiplication of invested capi-
tal and the interest rate on it (Figure 1). 
Although the concept of the firm performance measure-
ment was popularized at the end of the 20th century by 
the value-based management (VBM) movement – a theory 
assuming the firm’s value maximization as its ultimate 
goal – its history is much longer and it is tracked to the 
renowned Adam Smith’s thoughts by some authors (Me-
pham, 1980; Bughin – Copeland, 1997; Arnold, 2000). 
One of the most important advantages of residual income 
is its multi-tasking character. Although undoubtedly it is a 
periodic performance metric, it can also be used as tool 
allowing selection of investment projects in the way that is 
consistent with the signals given by the NPV method or as 
firm valuation tool, ensuring the same estimates as the 
widely accepted standard DCF method. The issue is cov-
ered in more detail in the second section of the article re-
ferring to – among other things – NPV-compatibility (or 
DCF-compatibility) of residual income. 
 
There are at least several versions of residual income 
known today. They can be divided into three groups dif-
fering in the valuation model they are based on: account-
ing, economic and hybrid (Figure 2). 
Accounting variants of residual income utilize the historic 
cost concept in fixed assets valuation and their consump-
tion (depreciation) estimation. Expectations concerning fu-
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Figure 2. Three groups of residual income concepts 
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income formula consists of1. The group is represented by 
the oldest and the simplest version of the measure which 
is residual income based exclusively on unadjusted book 
values. It will be marked RIBV hereafter (see for example 
McTaggart et al., 1994). The group contains also the most 
famous adaptation of the residual income concept, 
namely economic value added – EVA® – marketed by 
Stern Stewart & Co (Stewart, 1991; Ehrbar, 1998; Young 
– O’Byrne, 2001)2. Three versions of cash value added – 
CVA – the most important competitor of EVA, are also in-
cluded in the group (Knight, 1998; Young – O’Byrne, 
2001; Weissenrieder, 2000; Martin – Petty, 2000)3. Some 
of the accounting versions of residual income – like RIBV – 
make use of standard book depreciation (e.g. straight 
line), other (EVA, CVA® and CVACFROI) exploit annuity de-
preciation or its mutation which is the sinking fund me-
thod (the class they are included in will be marked RIANN 
henceforth), while – finally – CVA in its simplest form is 
calculated before subtracting depreciation. RIANN can be 
computed with cost of capital rate (see for example Ste-
wart, 2002) or with IRR (see for example Grant, 2003; 
Young – O’Byrne, 2001; Cwynar, 2009). 
The perspective taken in the residual income calculation 
that is based on the economic model is completely differ-
ent. While the accounting model is past oriented, the eco-
nomic one is forward-looking. It assumes that the value of 
capital invested in a firm’s assets is determined by future 
cash flow from the capital. In other words, the value of the 
assets the firm’s capital was invested in – named eco-
nomic value – as well as their consumption (so called 
economic depreciation), is affected by expectations con-
cerning future results. The logic that is behind the model 
is clearly reflected in the discounted cash flow (DCF) valu-
ation model. The residual economic income – REI – can 
be considered a representative of the group (Bausch et 
al., 2003). Shareholder value added (SVA), the well-known 
v a r i a n t  o f  r e s i d u a l  i n c o m e  c r e a t e d  b y  A .  R a p p a p o r t  
(1986), can be regarded a mutation of REI4.  
The third group of residual income variants – hybrid – 
consists of concepts combining features of the accounting 
model with the economic model. For this reason the 
measures included in the group are sometimes treated as 
syncretic or eclectic (see for example Skinner, 1998; Leis-
tikow – Ferguson, 1998). For instance, in refined economic 
                                                 
1 In fact expectations concerning future results can influence these ver-
sions of residual income via cost of capital assuming that it is calculated 
as a weighted average cost of equity and debt (WACC) with market 
shares of them in total capital (which is typically recommended). Be-
cause all residual income variants are diminished by cost of capital, the 
inclusion of market values in WACC calculation does not differentiate 
the competing forms of the measure. For this reason the impact of ex-
pectations concerning future results – via WACC – on residual income 
was excluded from the analysis in the article. 
2 EVA is registered trademark of Stern Stewart & Co. 
3 The simplest form of CVA is presented in S.D. Young, S.F. O’Byrne (2001) 
and J.A. Knight (1998). Another version of the measure is the registered 
trademark of Anelda AB (it will be marked CVA® hereafter) presented in F. 
Weissenrieder (2000). However, probably the most popular is the version 
marketed by Credit Suisse that is calculated on the basis of CFROI® (it is 
registered trademark of Credit Suisse), presented in J.D. Martin, J.W. 
Petty (2000), among others. It will be marked CVACFROI henceforth. 
4 It is worth noticing that A. Rappaport doesn’t consider his own metric a 
variant of residual income. 
value added – REVA – calculus (Bacidore et al., 1997) the 
measure of invested capital is the firm’s market value 
(economic view) while the measure of return on the capi-
tal is net operating profit after tax (NOPAT), i.e. a measure 
of income diminished by standard book depreciation (ac-
counting view). Besides REVA, the group is represented by 
earned economic income – EEI (Grinyer, 1985; Grinyer, 
1987) and net economic income – NEI (Drukarczyk – 
Schueler, 2000)5. It is worth noticing that two measures 
standing for the group – EEI and NEI, as well as REI – 
classified in the previous group – refer to I. Fisher’s 
(1906) and J. Hicks’s (1946) concept of economic income 
(hereafter EI) which is reflected in their names.  
The authors of some metrics classified as residual income 
variants in the article do not consider them that way (see 
for example Grinyer, 1985 and Rappaport, 1986). How-
ever, each performance measure in which the computa-
tional formula can be re-arranged to a monetary differ-
ence between periodic return on capital and periodic cost 
of capital (capital charge) was supposed to be a form of 
residual income in the article (notabene, it is worth notic-
ing that in some residual income variants depreciation is 
subtracted in return on capital estimation while in others 
– in capital charge estimation). In fact, all the metrics dis-
cussed in the paper – including J. Grinyer’s EEI and A. 
Rappaport’s SVA – satisfy this condition. 
The premises of residual income utilization are twofold. 
One can distinguish external and internal premises. The 
difference deals with the ultimate users of residual in-
come. External premises relate to the utilization of the 
measure by outside users (financial analysts, brokers, in-
vestors) and are based on the assumption that residual 
income can improve investment choices made by them 
(see for example Grant, 1996; Grant, 2003; Abate et al., 
2004; Grant–Abate, 2001; Leifkowitz, 1999). Internal 
premises refer to the utilization of residual income by a 
firm’s managers and assume that the measure – used as 
the basis of evaluation and compensation of the manag-
ers’ achievements – can improve their investment deci-
sions, ultimately aimed at the firm’s value maximization 
(see for example Stern et al., 1996; Stewart et al., 2002). 
It seems that internal premises are put on the first plan, at 
least in VBM theory. The existing literature on residual in-
come evidently exposes the internal premises. From the 
internal premises perspective, the fundamental function 
of residual income is to motivate managers – evaluated 
and remunerated on the basis of its level – to make deci-
sions translating into the firm’s value maximization and to 
reward them for results of the decisions. To be effective in 
the field, residual income has to become the centerpiece 
of the incentive compensation plan, the foundation of 
managerial bonuses.  
3. Evaluation of Residual Income Forms:  
Key Criteria 
There are some basic criteria that must be fulfilled by re-
sidual income if it is to be an effective motivational tool 
(see for example Ponssard – Larmande, 2004; Ponssard 
– Larmande, 2006; Grinyer – Lyon, 1989; Stronka, 2004; 
                                                 
5 It is worth noticing that J. Grinyer doesn’t consider his own metric a 
variant of residual income. Andrzej CWYNAR 
Merchant, 2007). They are presented in Figure 3. Firstly, it 
must be goal-congruent, which means that the decisions 
made by managers who are evaluated and compensated 
on the basis of the measure maximize the firm’s value. 
Secondly, it must be controllable which means that the 
factors determining residual income are under the mana-
gers’ control. Thirdly, it must be understandable and prac-
ticable which means that managers can easily compre-
hend the way their bonuses are determined and the me-
thods that can be used to increase the firm’s residual in-
come, its value and their own bonuses and – what’s more 
– the utilization of residual income calculus must be easy 
and straightforward in practice. 
 
Goal-congruity 
According to agency theory (Jensen, 1986; Jensen – Meck-
ling, 1976) preferences of managers – owners’ agents 
may differ from the owners’ (principals of managers) pre-
ferences which can result in making decisions by mana-
gers in a way that is not optimum from the owners’ point 
of view (that doesn’t maximize the firm value). In the field 
of investment decisions it means that managerial 
selection of projects may be driven by a rule differing from 
the non-negative NPV maximization rule which is regarded 
as the capital budgeting decision imperative ensuring the 
firm value maximization (see for example Solomon, 
1963). The imperative requires managers to accept all in-
vestment projects exhibiting non-negative NPV (and only 
those projects) under the unlimited investment budget as-
sumption, and to accept investment projects having the 
highest positive NPV under the limited investment budget 
assumption and in the setting in which one must choose 
among mutually exclusive investment projects (see for e-
xample Pfeiffer, 2004). To assure conformity of managers’ 
interests with their own interests, the firms’ owners must 
employ mechanisms that could make managers into own-
ers. One of them is a managerial bonus plan utilizing a 
strongly goal-congruent periodic performance measure. As 
G. Friedl (2005, p. 5-6) pertinently points out, the measure 
satisfies the goal-congruity requirement “if a better-in-
formed manager, whose compensation is based on this 
performance measure, takes the same actions as head-
quarters or the owners would take if they had the same in-
formation”. It means that in light of the non-negative NPV 
maximization imperative “we need a performance mea-
sure, which ensures that it is optimal for the agent to se-
lect the NPV-maximizing portfolio” (Mohnen, 2004, p. 3). 
There are three forms (degrees) of residual income goal-
congruity discussed in the literature (see for example 
Dutta – Reichelstein, 2005; Mohnen – Bareket, 2007): 
weak, strong and robust (or perfect). Although the existing 
literature doesn’t mention such a form, distinguishing 
semi-strong goal-congruity of residual income also seems 
to be justified (Figure 4). 
The weak form of goal-congruity should be interpreted as 
merely NPV-compatibility of residual income. Residual in-
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Figure 4. Forms of residual income goal-congruity 
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all periodic residual incomes from the entire economic life 
of an investment project – after discounting – equals NPV 
of the project (see for example Pfeiffer, 2004; Drukarczyk 
– Schueler, 2000). Weak-goal congruity ensures proper 
(i.e. NPV, and ultimately firm value, maximizing) invest-
ment decisions made by managers only on the condition 
that they are not impatient (myopic) as well as on the con-
dition that the discount rate assumed by them is the same 
as the discount rate assumed by the firm’s owners. If 
these two requirements are fulfilled, then the residual in-
come variant exhibiting only weak goal-congruity should 
make managers realize an NPV-maximizing investment 
program even under the limited investment budget as-
sumption and in the setting in which one must choose 
among mutually exclusive projects (see Mohnen, 2004, p. 
1). However, if managers are impatient, which means that 
they do not take into consideration – for various reasons – 
cash flows from throughout the entire economic life of the 
project in their investment decisions, or they are more risk 
averse than the firm’s owners are, which is reflected in the 
higher discount rate assumed by these managers, then 
weakly goal-congruent residual income utilized as the ba-
sis of managerial bonuses can fail as the tool of selecting 
investment projects in the proper (i.e. firm value max-
imizing) manner.  
The attribute of the strong form of goal-congruity is con-
formity of the sign of residual income in each and every 
period of the investment project’s economic life with the 
sign of its NPV. Strong goal-congruity should be consi-
dered an improved form of weak-goal congruity in the 
sense that to become strongly goal-congruent, residual in-
come must be firstly NPV-compatible. Strong goal-congru-
ity ensures NPV-maximizing decisions made by managers 
even under the managerial impatience supposition (as 
well as in the situation in which the discount rate as-
sumed by managers is higher than the discount rate as-
sumed by owners) which seems to be a much more realis-
tic assumption than that of managerial patience. As W. 
Schulze and A. Weiler (2008, p. 7) rightly indicate, the 
compliance of the sign of residual income in each and 
every period of a project’s economic life with the sign of its 
NPV “creates a situation in which every period provides 
the same investment incentive. That is, even if the man-
ager cared only about his rewards of a single period, he 
would still choose the efficient investment level. This is 
true for every period and therefore the manager’s dis-
count rate and time horizon are irrelevant for his evalua-
tion of the desirability of a project”. Yet strong goal-con-
gruity doesn’t guarantee the proper capital budgeting de-
cisions in terms of a limited investment budget as well as 
in the setting assuming the necessity of choice among 
mutually exclusive projects. 
The meaning of semi-strong goal-congruity is the same as 
the meaning of strong goal-congruity, however it can be 
achieved only on condition that periodic cash flow is as-
sumed to be constant. 
Robust (perfect) goal-congruity is achieved when residual 
incomes exhibited by investment project having higher 
NPV are higher in each and every period than residual in-
comes of another investment project having lower NPV. 
The residual income variant which is perfectly goal-con-
gruent should ensure the proper capital budgeting deci-
sions in all possible settings (under managerial patience 
and under managerial impatience assumptions, in the sit-
uation in which managers assume the same discount rate 
as the owners do and in the situation in which the dis-
count rates of these two groups differ, under unlimited 
and limited investment budgets, in the situation requiring 
the choice among mutually exclusive projects). A. Mohnen 
and M. Bareket (2007, p. 3) appropriately point out that 
cons i st ency of t h e s i gn of  res i du al i ncome i n ea ch a nd 
every period of the project’s economic life with its NPV 
sign (strong goal-congruity) can’t assure the proper in-
vestment decisions in the capital rationing scenario be-
cause it doesn’t refer to the size of various projects’ NPV 
and ranking of the projects based on the size. 
Among the concepts discussed in the article there are two 
versions of residual income that do not offer even weak 
goal-congruity: the simplest variant of CVA and REVA. CVA 
can’t be NPV-compatible (weakly goal-congruent) because 
the preliminary condition of the identity is subtraction of 
depreciation in the residual income formula. However, 
CVA in its simplest form is a periodic performance mea-
sure before deducting depreciation. The REVA case is 
more troubling and complex because it measures residual 
income after subtracting depreciation. Yet the sum of all 
periodic REVAs from the entire economic life of a project is 
the same as its NPV but only when the periodic REVAs are 
not discounted. In light of the NPV-compatibility definition, 
REVA is not NPV-compatible because the identity requires 
discounting of expected residual incomes.  
Residual income based exclusively on unadjusted book 
values (RIBV) is weakly goal-congruent. NPV-compatibility of 
the simplest and the oldest version of the metric has got a 
long history and was proved for the first time by G. Prei-
nreich (1937).  
Further, the most famous forms of residual income pro-
moted by consulting firms – EVA, CVACFROI and CVA® – 
represent the semi-strong goal-congruity class. No matter 
the basis of RIANN calculus (COC or IRR), under the cons-
tant cash flow assumption the version of residual income 
must have the same sign – in each and every period of 
the project’s economic life – as the sign of its NPV be-
cause of some mechanisms embedded in the calculus. 
Assuming that it is based on COC, one obtains a stream of 
constant RIANN because constant total cost of assets’ 
ownership (capital charge plus depreciation) is subtracted 
from constant cash flow. The sign of NPV determines the 
sign of the difference. On the other hand, assuming that 
RIANN calculus is based on IRR, then one obtains constant 
periodic return on capital rates equal to IRR which – after 
subtracting the cost of capital rate – determine the RIANN 
sign. The sign must be the same as the NPV because the 
latter one depends on the difference between IRR and 
cost of capital rate (Cwynar, 2009).   
REI can be considered a strongly goal-congruent variant of 
residual income but only on condition that it is calculated Andrzej CWYNAR 
with IRR as the basis of the calculation. In fact, REI com-
putation – as RIANN – may utilize IRR or cost of capital rate 
(COC) in economic value and economic depreciation esti-
mations (these two versions of REI will be marked REIIRR 
and REICOC, respectively, hereafter). In terms of fixed cost 
of capital rate – which was assumed here – REIIRR must 
have the same sign in each and every period of a project’s 
economic life as its NPV sign, because the attribute of the 
residual income form is constancy of periodic return on 
capital rate, which coincides with IRR. It means that if NPV 
of the project is positive, then its rate of return on capital 
– equal to IRR – must be higher than COC in every period 
resulting in every period’s positive REIIRR. However, the 
most important drawback of REIIRR is that its calculation 
assumes IRR as the reinvestment rate. It is argued that 
assuming cost of capital, reflecting a so-called normal re-
turn, as the reinvestment rate is much more realistic (see 
for example Skinner 1993, p. 738). IRR is a project-spe-
cific return that may not be automatically achieved on 
other investments. The REICOC formula eliminates the 
weakness by assuming cost of capital as reinvestment 
rate. Yet, REICOC can’t be goal-congruent in the normal 
sense because as long as actual results are as expected, 
REICOC equals exactly zero. It means that at the outset of 
each investment project one obtains a stream of expected 
residual incomes amounting to z e r o  i n  a l l  p e r i o d s  e c o -
nomic life of the project consists of. As J. Drukarczyk and 
A. Schueler (2000, p. 263) correctly point out, the entire 
“expected value created by a project is attributed to the 
starting point”. Positive REICOC results from exceeding ex-
pectations while negative ones are exhibited when actual 
outcome is smaller than expected. What’s more, in the 
method of residual income calculation the sum of periodic 
depreciations (even after discounting) is not the same as 
initial capital outlay.  
Another strongly goal-congruent form of residual income is 
J. Grinyer’s EEI. The metric–based on Ladelle-Brief-Owen’s 
(LBO) method of depreciation (see Brief, 1967; Brief–
Owen, 1968; Skinner, 1993) – avoids the weaknesses of 
REIIRR and REICOC: the assumed reinvestment rate is cost 
of capital (as in REICOC), yet the sum of periodic deprecia-
tions from the entire economic life of a project equals the 
amount of capital initially invested in it (as in REIIRR). How-
ever, to be strongly goal-congruent, EEI requires cash flow 
from all periods included in the project’s economic life to 
be positive. Strong goal-congruity of the version of residual 
income – although not under the name of EEI – was for-
mally proved by S. Reichelstein (1997) and W. Rogerson 
(1997) which is mentioned by T. Pfeiffer (2004).  
Although NEI is not NPV-compatible in the standard man-
ner, it can guide managers’ investment decisions in the 
way that results in realization of an investment program 
that maximizes NPV in all possible settings (perfect goal-
congruity). This view can be easily justified knowing that 
periodic NEI equals a periodic change in NPV (assuming 
that NPV at the end of the period results from multiplica-
tion of NPV at the beginning of the period by the cost of 
capital rate factor6). It means that if only NPV at the begin-
ning of the project’s economic life is positive, it must be-
come bigger and bigger at the end of each consecutive 
year because the cost of capital factor is always positive. 
On the basis of the observation, one can draw a justified 
conclusion according to which NEI must have the same 
sign in each and every period as the sign of the project’s 
expected NPV (strong-goal congruity). For the same reason 
NEI for a project exhibiting higher NPV must be higher in 
each and every period than NEI for another project exhi-
biting lower NPV (robust goal-congruity) if only cost of capi-
tal rates as well as economic lives of the projects are ex-
actly the same.  
Assessment of goal-congruity of SVA is problematic be-
cause of unique properties of the concept (e.g. the perpe-
tuity assumption). They result in doubts as to the way SVA 
should be calculated on the individual investment project 
l ev el . A . R ap pa p ort , t h e i nvent or of  S VA , not  ev en onc e 
gives the example of such a calculation in his influential 
book (Rappaport, 1986). SVA calculus carried literally 
from entire firm level to the individual project level (utilizi-
ng the annuity assumption instead of the perpetuity as-
sumption because of the limited economic life of majority 
of investment projects) reveals that SVA is at best weakly 
goal-congruent. 
Controllability 
Controllability of a periodic performance measure reflects 
the degree to which its current level depends on decisions 
made by managers. Normally, a firm performance metric 
reveals not only results of their decisions but they are also 
affected by so-called systematic factors illustrating the 
situation in the economy as well as in the sector in which 
the firm competes. Economic values (and especially mar-
ket values) are usually considered less controllable than 
book values. For instance, periodic return on a company’s 
shares is on average more influenced by systematic fac-
tors than its return on capital invested in assets employed 
in operations and measured by operating profit. What’s 
more, economic values mirror expectations concerning fu-
ture results and not actual results already achieved. Seen 
from this perspective, economic values can be considered 
rather an opinion concerning a firm’s future performance 
than actual performance as an unquestionable fact. The 
performance measure that is based heavily on economic 
values would compensate managers for business promi-
ses reflected in expected performance rather than for ac-
tual performance that has already materialized. As A. Bar-
ton (1974, p. 672) rightly argues, the measure “refers to 
transactions that have not yet occurred. It relates to the 
transactions that are expected to occur in the future. It is 
a case of counting one’s chickens before any is hatched”. 
Assuming that controllability of expected performance is 
limited, one can say that a performance measure is con-
trollable to a substantial degree when its current level de-
pends mainly on managerial decisions reflected in actual 
results achieved so far and not expected results to be 
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achieved in the future. This issue is worth highlighting be-
cause the current level of the metric can be profoundly 
dependent on results of managerial decisions but yet ex-
pected in the future. On the basis of the observation one 
can argue that controllability of residual income is in-
versely dependent on the extent to which expectations 
concerning future results are included in its formula via 
economic values: the greater impact of expectations on 
residual income level, the lower its controllability.  
Three groups of residual income differing in the level of 
controllability can be distinguished from this point of view 
(Figure 5). The first group, consisting of RIBV, EVA and 
three versions of CVA, exhibits high controllability. Expec-
tations concerning future results are entirely not included 
in their computational formulas (except their impact on 
the formulas via cost of capital rate; the issue was men-
tioned in the second section of the article). Two other 
groups consist of residual income concepts including ex-
pectations but to different degrees. REVA, EEI and NEI 
demonstrate medium controllability in the sense that ex-
pectations influence only one component of their compu-
tational formulas (invested capital in REVA, return on capi-
tal in NEI and the so-called apportionment factor in EEI). 
The last group is represented by the residual income con-
cepts that are exposed to expectations in each part of 
their computational formulas – REI and SVA. 
Understandability and practicability 
Literature on goal-congruity of residual income is plentiful. 
Its controllability is the subject of scientific interest to a 
considerably smaller degree. However, a bibliography re-
ferring solely to understandability and practicability of re-
sidual income is extremely rare (see for example short 
commentaries on the complexity of chosen residual in-
come concepts in Morin – Jarrell, 2001, p. 339 or in 
Young – O’Byrne, 2001, p. 430) although the issue should 
not be regarded as of secondary importance. For example, 
J. Knight (1998, p. 200) writes: “If the measure is difficult 
to calculate, the manager is not likely to use it for decision 
making”. If he has to use it because performance mea-
sured by the metric determines his bonus, then utilization 
of such an incomprehensible measure may result in frus-
tration and low efficiency. K. Merchant (2007, p. 14) 
rightly indicates that “measures that aren’t understood 
have no motivational effects”. J. Martin and W. Petty 
(2000, p. 215) add that if the metric is too complex, then 
“it will become known simply as another finance exercise 
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Figure 5. Controllability of ten residual income variants analyzed in the article 
 
Source: Author Andrzej CWYNAR 
decision making within the company”. However, the un-
derstanding of the way performance measure’s values are 
set can come along with its limited practicability. Even the 
most understandable metrics may end up as just theoreti-
cal devices, whose practical use is – for a reason – ex-
cluded, despite their clarity and ease of comprehension. 
This can result – for example – from deficiency of data re-
quired in the measure calculation. 
To fill the gap in the knowledge on comparative unders-
tandability and practicability of the residual income con-
cepts discussed in the article, empirical research has 
been conducted by its author. Because the research va-
riables – understandability and practicability – are subjec-
tive in nature (opinions on understandability and practica-
bility of the same performance metric may differ conside-
rably), the reasoning on the issue was based on the judg-
ments collected via questionnaire. The questions included 
in it were answered by post-graduate students of Value 
Based Management Study (fifteenth and sixteenth edi-
tions), Company Valuation Methods Study (third and 
fourth editions) and Managerial Accounting and Control-
ling Study (tenth and eleventh editions) conducted by 
Warsaw School of Economics. The choice of the studies 
was dictated by their programs including such topics as 
firm performance measurement and management, and 
firm value management as well as expected competences 
of their participants. From their first editions the studies 
were attracting persons having high financial qualifica-
tions, often representing top management of large firms, 
their owners’ authorities or those dealing with financial is-
sues, and especially with firm performance measurement, 
in their work. This fact let us assume that the contents of 
the questionnaire would not be unfamiliar to them. 265 
students were asked to fill in the questionnaire between 
the beginning of May 2008 and the end of November 
2008. 60 persons returned the questionnaire with their 
answers to the questions included in it. It is worth noticing 
that from the point of view of the research purpose the 
rate of return (22,64% in the study) was not of special im-
portance as it is in a typical social study. The aim of the 
research was analogous to the aim of the pilot test that 
precedes the main study and is aimed at evaluating the 
research tool. Yet, in contradistinction to a standard pilot 
test, the aim of the study was to examine a managerial 
decision making tool, i.e. residual income presented in six 
variants marked in the following manner: 
1) RI1 – RIBV, 4)  RI4 – RIANN, 
2) RI2 – REVA,  5) RI5 – EEI, 
3) RI3 – REI,  6) RI6 – NEI. 
CVA in its simplest form (assumed to be the least useful in 
the studied set of residual income concepts because of its 
NPV-incompatibility) and SVA (assumed to be a more 
complex form of REI) were not included in the research. To 
preserve clarity of the study, two versions of REI calcula-
tion (based on IRR and based on COC) were not distin-
guished in the questionnaire. As mentioned in the second 
section of the article, RIANN should be considered a class 
of residual income concepts containing such forms of the 
measure as EVA, CVA® and CVACFROI. 
The study respondents were asked to classify the six va-
riants of residual income measurement into one of four 
sets: misunderstandable / impracticable, little unders-
tandable / little practicable, tolerably understandable / 
tolerably practicable and completely understandable / 
completely practicable. Further, respondents’ opinions on 
understandability and practicability of the six variants of 
residual income measurement given in the questionnaire 
were converted into indices according to the following 
rule: 
1)  misunderstandable / impracticable – 1, 
2)  little understandable / little practicable – 2, 
3)  tolerably understandable / tolerably practicable–3, 
4)  completely understandable/completely practicable– 4. 
Then, for each variant (and for each feature – understan-
dability and practicability – separately) weighted average 
indices were estimated assuming the procedure in which 
the weight is the percentage share of opinions indicating 
particular intensity of the feature in the total number of 
opinions that were given by the respondents. The indices 
obtained by respective residual income measures are de-
picted in the Graphs 1 and 2. 
 
One can make several interesting observations on the ba-
sis of the opinions given by the respondents who took part 
in the study. Firstly, their evaluations of understandability 




Graphs 1 and 2.  
Weighted average estimations of understandability 
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evaluations of practicability of them are very similar (how-
ever for each residual income variant the understandabil-
ity index was higher than the practicability index). Rank-
ings of the six residual income measurement concepts in-
cluded in the study – based on these two facets – are ex-
actly the same. Secondly, according to the respondents’ 
opinions, the most understandable – and at the same 
time the most practicable – form of residual income is the 
oldest one – RIBV. No respondent considered it misunders-
tandable or impracticable. Thirdly, it is worth noticing that 
NEI – the residual income variant exhibiting the highest 
degree of goal-congruity in the set of measures that was 
studied – was regarded relatively well understandable and 
practicable (more than RIANN represented by the most 
popular, contemporaneous variations such as EVA and 
CVACFROI). Fourthly, EEI was found to be the least unders-
tandable and the least practicable version of residual in-
come in the examined set of measures. 
Four-dimensional matrix of residual income variants 
The observations coming from the study presented in the 
previous section were used in the creation of a four-di-
mensional presentation of the residual income variants 
analyzed in the article (including goal-congruity, controlla-
bility, understandability and practicability). In order to do 
that, the understandability and practicability indices, ob-
tained in the study described briefly in the previous sec-
tion, were converted into degrees of intensity of these two 
features in the manner depicted in Table 1. 
Figure 6 illustrates 10 versions of residual income exa-
mined in the article from the point of view of four criteria: 
  Table 1 
Values of indices placed on the residual income variants examined in the study and degrees of 
understandability / practicability matched to them 
 
Value of the 
index  Degree of intensity of understandability / practicability 
1,00 – 1,50  Misunderstandable / Impracticable
1,51 – 2,50  Little understandable / Little practicable
2,51 – 3,50  Tolerably understandable / Tolerably practicable 



















































Figure 6. Four-dimensional matrix of residual income variants 
 
Source: Author Andrzej CWYNAR 
ultimate goal-congruity, controllability, understandability 
and practicability. The graph can be used as a simple, yet 
helpful, guide in choosing the residual income concept 
that is the most adequate as the basis of managerial bo-
nuses. There are several observations – key from the 
point of view of the choice – that can be made on the ba-
sis of its contents. 
Firstly, if the primary and necessary condition that must be 
satisfied by the metric aspiring to be an effective mana-
gerial incentive compensation tool is its ultimate goal-con-
gruity – at least in the weak form – then two of the ten re-
sidual income concepts discussed in the article – CVA in 
its simplest form and REVA – can be excluded from further 
analysis. They do not ensure even weak goal-congruity. 
REICOC should also be excluded for slightly different rea-
son, although still relating to the goal-congruity issue. At 
the outset of each project – no matter its NPV (positive or 
negative) – the project exhibits a stream of REICOC 
amounting to zero in each and every period of the entire 
economic life of the project. It means that the stream is 
not able to send the proper decisional signals concerning 
the desirability of the project realization. In this case NPV 
is not periodized – as in other residual income concepts 
that are NPV-compatible – but it is attributed to the mo-
ment of time on which the project is analyzed. In the case 
of this residual income concept the managers could be 
motivated and remunerated on the basis of deviations 
from expected performance, although such incentives 
may cause inappropriate managerial behavior (see for e-
xample Leistikow – Ferguson, 1998 and Bausch et al., 
2003).  
Secondly, one can argue that among the four features of 
residual income examined in the article (goal-congruity, 
controllability, understandability and practicability) con-
trollability is of secondary importance. This view can be 
justified by the fact that residual income can be the proper 
basis of bonuses only in the case of top managers be-
cause this is the only group of managers who can control 
– at least partly – all variables of which the residual in-
come formula consists of. For example, the decisional 
rights concerning the way a firm’s capital mix is structured 
are typically limited to top management. Therefore if we 
assume that residual income is to be utilized as the basis 
of top management bonuses, then the importance of the 
controllability issue decreases because this is the only 
team of the firm’s managers who can directly affect not 
only book values but also economic values (although to a 
limited degree). What’s more, one can argue that in the 
case of top management the problem of controllability – 
at least in the sense that the top managers can’t control 
so-called systematic factors influencing economic values 
– doesn’t exist (see for example Copeland – Dolgoff, 
2005, p. 230) or can be easily eliminated (by including 
systematic factors explicitly via indexation or implicitly via 
structure of top managerial pay – see for example Rappa-
port, 1999 and Guay et al., 2001).  
Thirdly, understandability and practicability may become 
crucial criteria when considering implementation of one of 
the competitive residual income concepts. Even the most 
goal-congruent version of the metric can be rejected in the 
choice because of its extremely limited understandability 
and practicability. It is worth noticing that there is a trade-
off between goal-congruity and two other discussed fea-
tures – understandability and practicability. Achieving 
successive degrees of goal-congruity of residual income 
(from weak through robust) comes at the cost of a bigger 
and bigger decrease in its understandability and practica-
bility. The prime driver of the improvement in the goal-
congruity is the way fixed assets’ depreciation is esti-
mated. In RIBV calculation (weak goal-congruity) it is stan-
dard book depreciation which is commonly understood 
and trivial in the calculation. RIANN (semi-strong goal-con-
gruity) – represented by EVA, CVA® and CVACFROI – re-
quires annuity or sinking fund depreciation which is not so 
easily comprehended and much more complex in calcula-
tion. It is symptomatic that – as S. O’Byrne (2000, p. 116) 
writes – “only one EVA company (…) has ever used sinking 
fund depreciation (…). Many EVA companies have consi-
dered sinking fund depreciation, but rejected it as too 
complicated to justify the benefit”. The shift from semi-
strong to strong goal-congruity requires substitution of an-
nuity (sinking fund) depreciation for another, even more 
complex, one (LBO method in EEI estimation or economic 
method in REI calculus).  
Fourthly, the RIANN group is not homogeneous from the 
point of view of understandability and practicability. EVA 
complexity increases along with the extent to which its 
calculation includes almost legendary accounting adjust-
ments. For example S. Young and S. O’Byrne (2001, p. 
430) regard EVA as a measure exhibiting high ease of cal-
culation when it is estimated without the adjustments and 
medium ease of calculation when it is estimated with 
them. The complexity of CFROI is well-documented in VBM 
literature. Even the author of the measure – B. Madden 
(1999, p. 210) – agrees that in the field of ease of imple-
mentation it is less attractive than EVA because of higher 
difficulty of computation. Complexity of CVA® is much less 
scrutinized in the literature, however one can easily ob-
serve some problematic issues that can influence its un-
derstandability / practicability (e.g. the need for converting 
nominal cost of capital values into real). However, it ap-
pears to be the most understandable and practicable re-
presentation of the RIANN class (assuming that EVA is cal-
culated in the way recommended by its architects, i.e. with 
accounting adjustments).  
Fifthly, from the perspective of the four discussed criteria 
of evaluation – goal-congruity, controllability, understan-
dability and practicability – RIBV deserves a relatively high 
rate in comparison with RIANN. It exhibits the same level of 
controllability as RIANN does, yet it can be considered much 
more understandable and practicable. Although its goal-
congruity is lower than it is for RIANN, it is so only under the 
assumption according to which periodic cash flow is con-
stant, which is rather a theoretical case. The advantage of  RESIDUAL INCOME IN FOUR DIMENSIONS:  
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RIANN over RIBV is thus only theoretical (at least in the set-
ting in which the goal-congruity effect of accounting ad-
justments is not taken into consideration). Knowing that, 
one can formulate a justified opinion according to which 
RIBV –  f r o m  a  p r a c t i c a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  –  s e e m s  t o  b e  a  
slightly more adequate basis of managerial bonuses than 
RIANN is.  
Sixthly, assuming that the issue of controllability is of se-
condary importance in utilization of residual income to 
motivate and compensate top managers, one can formu-
late the thesis according to which the choice of the most 
adequate form of residual income for incentive compen-
sation must be based on comparative analysis of goal-
congruity and understandability / practicability of the two 
available options – it seems that the choice can be re-
duced to a choice between RIBV and NEI. Thus, the first op-
tion is RIBV exhibiting only weak goal-congruity, yet highly 
understandable and practicable at the same time. The 
other option is NEI – a robustly goal-congruent residual in-
come variant while characterizing considerably lower un-
derstandability / practicability than RIBV. NEI appears to be 
a better choice than EEI or REIIRR because at the same 
level of controllability and a comparable level of unders-
tandability / practicability, it ensures a higher level of goal-
congruity being the fundamental criterion in residual in-
come concepts evaluation.  
However, there are some important issues that can de-
crease the rate placed on NEI one should take into con-
sideration. The first one is deficient literature on the me-
thod of measuring residual income and lack of profound 
formal tests as well as empirical studies dedicated to the 
way NEI drives investment decisions made by managers. 
In fact, to the best knowledge of the author of the article, 
there is only one publication presenting this very promis-
ing residual income form (Drukarczyk – Schueler, 2000). 
Recommendation of a method that has not been exten-
sively tested is at least questionable. Another important 
issue that should be mentioned is the behavior of NEI un-
der uncertainty (when actual performance differs from ex-
pected performance). It can b e  e a s i l y  s h o w n  t h a t  a d d i -
tional (incremental) NEI resulting from unexpectedly better 
/ worse performance of a firm is the same as abnormal 
stock return earned by the firm owners in the same period 
of time (in which the market was informed about the un-
expected improvement / decline in performance). How-
ever, the unexpected change in performance causes the 
firm to exhibit incremental NEIs also in subsequent years 
although the value creation for the firm owners – mea-
sured by abnormal stock return – was limited to the year 
in which the information on unexpectedly better / worse 
performance went public (Cwynar, 2009). Further, utiliza-
tion of NEI requires acceptation of a particular method of 
invested capital estimation. J. O’Hanlon and K. Peasnell 
(2001), referring to the work of R. Anthony (1982), name 
it unrecovered capital. The use of an alternative method of 
capital estimation means that there exists an alternative 
accounting being utilized in the firm. W. Schultze and A. 
Weiler (2008) have reasonable doubts as to its relevance 
from the point of view of other users of accounting infor-
mation. They write that “it is unclear, if such goal-congru-
ent accounting rules still result in information which is also 
relevant for other purposes of accounting, in particular for 
external users for making economic decisions” (Schultze – 
Weiler, 2008, p. 4). What’s more, the use of NEI would be 
probably relatively easy in the firms that are quoted on 
stock exchanges, yet it would come across substantial ob-
stacles in firms that are not (because of the necessity of 
economic value estimations on a regular basis). 
The most important weakness of the competitor of NEI – 
RIBV – is its low goal-congruity. However, as it was men-
tioned in the second section of the article, it becomes ro-
bustly goal-congruent under the condition according to 
which firm managers are not impatient (myopic), taking 
cash flow from the entire economic life of investment 
projects into consideration while making capital budgeting 
decisions. In such a setting, the problem of low goal-con-
gruity disappears. To make it disappear one must find a 
way to lengthen the managerial decisional horizon. The 
existing literature discusses some potential solutions to 
the problem. One of them is a so-called bonus bank re-
commended by Stern Stewart & Co., among others (see 
for example Stewart, 1991). The observation means that 
there are two alternative ways of achieving improvements 
of residual income goal-congruity (see Schultze – Weiler, 
2008): shifts in the method of fixed assets valuation and 
their consumption (depreciation) estimation (inside the 
metric formula) and utilization of additional mechanisms 
aimed at lengthening the decision horizon of managers 
(outside the metric formula). What’s more, there are some 
preliminary empirical findings suggesting that managerial 
decisions under various metrics’ regimes may be more 
goal-congruent than theory predicts. For example, Arnold 
et al.(2006) note that managers may behave as if they do 
not take exclusively their own interests into consideration 
when making investment decisions but consider a 
broader, social context of the decision making process. It 
may suggest that RIBV, weakly goal-congruent in theory, is 
actually more goal-congruent in practice. Further, J. 
Grinyer et al. (1999, p. 14) notice that managerial myopia 
may not be as obvious as many authors suggest. Because 
of some negative consequences of maximization of cur-
rent profits (e.g. overoptimistic market reactions may 
cause an unjustified increase in expectations which can 
frustrate and threaten job security of managers), the 
managers may not prefer maximization of current profits 
to growth in profits over a long period of time. 
4. Conclusions 
Residual income should be considered rather a set of me-
trics than one particular metric. The options that are 
within the set differ in fundamental aspects: their goal-
congruity, controllability, understandability and Andrzej CWYNAR 
practicability. These aspects are of special importance 
assuming that residual income is to serve as a behavioral, 
i.e. incentive compensation tool. Although goal-congruity 
of residual income should be regarded the prime criterion, 
strongly or even perfectly goal-congruent versions of the 
metric may fail as the basis of managerial bonuses 
because of low controllability or – even more plausible – 
low understandability and practicability. The decision as to 
the method of residual income measurement which will 
b e  u t i l i z e d  i n  p r a c t i c e  m u s t  b e  b a s e d  o n  c a r e f u l  a n d  
comprehensive analysis of the available options in at least 
four crucial dimensions including not only goal-congruity 
but also controllability, understandability and 
practicability. The results of the analysis presented in the 
article reveal that two forms of residual income may 
deserve special attention. One of them is net economic 
income (NEI), the only robustly goal-congruent variant of 
the metric within the set studied in the paper. The other 
one is the oldest and the simplest version of residual 
income based exclusively on unadjusted book values 
(RIBV). Its main advantage is high controllability, 
understandability and practicability, while the major 
disadvantage is relatively low goal-congruity. However, 
there are some reasons for which one can expect that 
goal-congruity of RIBV in practice is higher than in theory. 
Even if that would not be true, there are some ways – not 
related to the manner in which the residual income 
formula is structured – that can be used to improve its 
goal-congruity. In contradistinction to RIBV, extensively dis-
cussed and tested for many years, NEI – although a very 
promising variation of the residual income concept – can’t 
be the subject of a justified recommendation because of 
insufficient theoretical and practical examination. 
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